ITSG-33 (PBMM) control mapping for AccessPoint for Microsoft 365 (2.6.0), GC Cloud Guardrails, and SA&A guidance for Canadian federal government departments — a publisher self-assessment, not an authorization
Last updated: November 10, 2026 by Steve
GC Security Controls Reference
This page is for Canadian federal government departments conducting a Security Assessment and Authorization (SA&A) for AccessPoint. It maps AccessPoint's security controls to the ITSG-33 framework, GC Cloud Guardrails, and related TBS/CCCS requirements. PBMM is the standard we design against; nothing on this page is a certification, an authorization or a statement of compliance. Your authorizing official makes the authorization decision.
Which edition this page covers. The mapping describes AccessPoint for Microsoft 365 as a department deploys it into its own Azure subscription and Microsoft 365 tenant. Hosted AccessPoint, which Realizer operates at app.realizer.io, is a different arrangement: Realizer is the service provider there, and the hosted service has not been assessed or authorized as a service. See Hosted AccessPoint below.
For the full technical architecture, see the Technical Architecture page. The publisher also maintains a detailed ITSG-33 security control profile (Protected B, Medium integrity, Medium availability) for AccessPoint 2.6.0, covering the CCCS Medium Cloud Profile control by control with the evidence behind each row, the correspondence to the successor catalogue ITSP.10.033, a configuration checklist for a PBMM deployment and a list of known gaps. It is a publisher self-assessment written from the product's own code, templates and documentation to support your SA&A team; no third party has reviewed it, and it is not an authorization, an audit report or a certification. Ask the publisher for a copy.
Architecture Summary for Assessors
AccessPoint runs entirely within the department's own Microsoft 365 and Azure tenant. The security-relevant facts underpinning the mappings below are:
- Backend — an ASP.NET Core Web API on Azure App Service (Linux), Azure SQL Database, Azure Blob Storage and a Key Vault (on by default), all deployed into the department's own Azure subscription. Office, HTML and e-mail conversion runs in a document worker (a Container App) in the same subscription, on AccessPoint's own document engine, with no inbound endpoint and access to a transient conversion container only.
- Identity — Microsoft Entra ID is the sole identity provider (JWT bearer tokens). The App Service authenticates to backend services with a system-assigned managed identity; Azure SQL is created Entra-first with Entra-only authentication — no SQL credential ever exists, so there is nothing to store, rotate, or disable.
- Access control — granular, permission-based access control enforced server-side on every API endpoint: a product-defined catalog of atomic permission codes is grouped into tenant-configurable roles, and PII-filter middleware strips requestor PII from responses for any caller not holding the view-requestor-PII permission. Where one deployment serves several departments' tenants, a SQL Server row-level security policy (2.6.0) keeps each tenant's rows apart in the database itself, under the application's tenant filter.
- Licensing — a lapsed or revoked license makes the deployment read-only rather than unavailable (2.6.0): records stay readable and exportable, and every change is refused until renewal. The API keeps working for 30 days on its last validated license if the publisher cannot be reached.
- Encryption — TLS 1.3 at the App Service front door (TLS 1.2+ on Azure SQL and Blob Storage); TDE on the database and AES-256 SSE on Blob Storage at rest, with customer-managed keys supported for both. Every new data-protection key (which protects stored connector and payment-provider secrets) is wrapped by an RSA-3072 key in the deployment's Key Vault, and every use of that key is logged. Upgrades keep a customer-managed storage key.
- Audit — an immutable field-level audit trail plus a hash-chained (SHA-256), append-only audit ledger with court-ready per-request case audit exports (formerly "evidence packages"); an opt-in WORM (write-once) blob container can make them immutable at the storage layer. Telemetry in Application Insights / Log Analytics with default metric alert rules, Microsoft Defender for SQL enabled by default, and opt-in Microsoft Defender for Storage on-upload malware scanning that blocks a flagged file from preview, playback, download, and release.
- Optional components — Azure AI Speech (transcription), Azure AI Document Intelligence (OCR and on-screen text), the scale-to-zero media and accessibility-checker jobs, and the public intake portal all deploy into the department's own subscription with managed-identity-only access and keys disabled. Face detection and region tracking for video redaction run in the department's own App Service or media job with no external call. The portal is a separate web app whose identity reaches only its own database schema and its own two storage containers, so the internet-facing surface holds no access to case documents. Worker container images are code only; departments mirror them into their own Azure Container Registry and pin them by digest so no runtime pull depends on the publisher.
- Release integrity — every release is published with a
SHA256SUMSmanifest, detached signatures of every file, the publisher's public key and software bills of materials (SBOMs). Version folders are written once and never overwritten; the deployment script and the in-product package installer verify the signatures and refuse anything that does not check out, and the signing key is built into the product rather than taken from the download site. - Publisher boundary — license validation authenticates with an Entra token (the token's tenant ID claim identifies the tenant) and transmits only the tenant ID, API version, and the API's own base URL; the response is a signed license token plus the latest published AccessPoint version so the Setup panel can show an "Update available" notice (no usage or case data). No customer case data is transmitted to or stored by the publisher. The single optional egress is the Teams activity-feed notification payload (routing GUIDs plus, by default, the notification title/preview and acting-user name — never requestor PII), relayed through the publisher's multi-tenant app because Graph requires the manifest-owning app to send it. A department can minimise it (a toggle strips names and free text, leaving only routing identifiers) or eliminate it entirely (self-host the relay so nothing reaches the publisher); email and the in-app feed carry the same notices in-tenant. See Teams Notification Data Sharing.
GC Security Framework Alignment
| Framework | How AccessPoint Aligns |
|---|---|
| ITSG-33 (PBMM profile) | Security controls mapped to every ITSG-33 family in the publisher's self-assessment. See the ITSG-33 Control Family Mapping below. ITSG-33 Annex 3A was superseded in March 2026 by ITSP.10.033; the profile keeps the Annex 3A identifiers your SA&A templates use and gives the correspondence. |
| GC Cloud Guardrails | Each of the 13 guardrails mapped to what AccessPoint does and what the department configures. See the GC Cloud Guardrails table. |
| Policy on Government Security | System designed for formal SA&A. The authorization boundary is defined in the Authorization Boundary section below. |
| Directive on Security Management | Audit trail, access control, and continuous-monitoring capabilities support the department's ongoing security management. |
| Directive on Service and Digital | Cloud-native architecture aligned with the GC cloud-first directive. Deploys entirely within the department's existing M365 and Azure tenant. |
| CCCS Cloud Security Risk Management | Shared responsibility documented between Microsoft, the department, the product and the publisher. Microsoft states that CCCS has assessed Azure and Microsoft 365 up to PBMM; the department confirms that every service and region it deploys is in that assessment's scope. |
Canadian Data Residency
For Government of Canada deployments, AccessPoint is deployed to Canadian Azure regions (Canada Central or Canada East): every resource takes the region of the resource group it is deployed into, and the template does not restrict the region itself. All stored data — including request records, uploaded documents, audit trails, and telemetry — resides within the selected Canadian region, and is not stored outside Canada unless the department configures geo-replication to a region outside Canada.
The exceptions for processing are the ones the department chooses, and each should be assessed:
- AI Assist. From a Canadian region, Azure OpenAI offers only the global deployment type, so AI inference may be processed outside Canada (the EU and US data-zone type does not cover Canada). Stored data stays in the region. Leave AI Assist off unless the department accepts this.
- Azure Front Door, if deployed in front of the portal or the API, is a global service.
- The Teams relay in its default mode passes notification metadata through the publisher's service; the Minimise toggle reduces it to identifiers, and the direct mode removes it.
- A payment provider processes payments in its own jurisdictions.
- Document Intelligence is created in Canada Central when the resource group is in Canada East, because Canada East does not offer it.
Microsoft states that the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) has assessed Azure and Microsoft 365 up to PBMM (Protected B, Medium Integrity, Medium Availability) against the CCCS Medium profile. That assessment covers Microsoft's services, not AccessPoint or Realizer's services; confirm that each service you deploy — in particular Container Apps, Azure Front Door and Azure OpenAI global deployments — is within its scope.
What PBMM Means for AccessPoint
- Protected B — AccessPoint handles requestor PII (name, email, phone, address) and potentially sensitive government records. The application's PII-filter middleware, role-based access control, and encryption controls are designed for Protected B data.
- Medium Integrity — All data modifications are captured in an immutable audit trail, reinforced by a hash-chained audit ledger. Database constraints and API-level validation protect against unauthorized modification.
- Medium Availability — The application is stateless, with all state in Azure SQL and Blob Storage. Azure platform SLAs and customer-configurable redundancy support medium-availability requirements. The profile assumes statutory processing tolerates an outage measured in hours; confirm that against your business impact analysis.
AccessPoint is not designed or assessed for Protected C or classified information, and nothing in the product refuses such content: keeping it out is the department's handling rule.
ITSG-33 Control Family Mapping
The table below maps each ITSG-33 control family to the relevant sections of the Technical Architecture page. Use this as a starting point when evaluating AccessPoint against your department's PBMM security control profile.
| ITSG-33 Family | Control Area | Where Addressed |
|---|---|---|
| AC — Access Control | Authentication, authorization, least privilege, server-side RBAC, PII filtering, session management | Authentication and Identity, Authorization and RBAC, Privacy by Design |
| AU — Audit and Accountability | Logging, immutable audit trail, hash-chained ledger, monitoring, log retention | Logging, Monitoring, and Audit |
| CA — Security Assessment and Authorization | SA&A process, system boundary, continuous monitoring | Authorization Boundary (this page); Platform Overview; continuous monitoring via Logging, Monitoring, and Audit |
| CM — Configuration Management | Baseline configuration, change control, hardening defaults | Deployment Model (hardening defaults, additive DacPac migrations) |
| CP — Contingency Planning | Backup, disaster recovery, business continuity | Stateless App Service (all state in Azure SQL and Blob Storage); Azure-managed SQL backups, whose retention and backup storage redundancy the department sets; the template deploys locally redundant blob storage, so plan an independent copy — see Disaster Recovery. A lapsed license makes the deployment read-only, never unavailable, and the API keeps working for 30 days without the publisher |
| IA — Identification and Authentication | Entra ID identity provider, MFA, managed identity, Entra-only SQL auth | Authentication and Identity |
| IR — Incident Response | Incident handling, notification, reporting to CCCS | Immutable audit trail, hash-chained ledger, and Log Analytics support investigation — see Logging, Monitoring, and Audit. Security advisories and incident notices reach the department's own confirmed security contacts through its deployment, and its account contact directly — see Security Advisories and Incident Notification. Departments report cyber events to CCCS per GC requirements. |
| MP — Media Protection | Data-at-rest encryption, media sanitization | Encryption, Data Residency and Sovereignty |
| PE — Physical and Environmental Protection | Physical security of infrastructure | Azure CSP responsibility — covered by Microsoft's CCCS assessment for PBMM |
| PL — Planning | Security plans, system authorization boundary | Platform Overview; Authorization Boundary (this page) |
| RA — Risk Assessment | Threat/risk assessment, vulnerability scanning | Department-conducted VAPT and TRA (see Key Documents to Request); Azure platform scanning by Microsoft |
| SA — System and Services Acquisition | Supply chain, third-party dependencies, vendor practices | Component Inventory, What the Publisher Operates; signed releases with software bills of materials, write-once version folders and promotion gates; mirrorable, digest-pinned worker images; no commercial document SDK; full dependency inventory available on request |
| SC — System and Communications Protection | Encryption in transit, tenant isolation, boundary protection | Encryption, Data Residency and Sovereignty, Network and Firewall, Zero Trust Alignment. Dedicated resources per deployment; the template offers private endpoints, VNet integration, and Front Door with a web application firewall. Key Vault wraps the data-protection keys. |
| SI — System and Information Integrity | Patching, vulnerability management, input integrity | Deployment Model (hardening defaults, additive migrations, signed releases). Defender for Storage malware scanning gates every release path. OS/runtime patched by Azure; application code and dependencies patched by the publisher, with security advisories delivered in the signed license token. |
GC Cloud Guardrails
The following table maps AccessPoint's controls to the GC Cloud Guardrails — the mandatory minimum security configurations for GC cloud adoption. It is a design mapping for AccessPoint for Microsoft 365; meeting each guardrail also depends on how the department configures its tenant and subscription.
| Guardrail | How AccessPoint Addresses It |
|---|---|
| 01 — Protect root/global admin accounts | AccessPoint does not use or require Global Admin accounts at runtime. Admin roles within the application are separate from Azure/M365 admin roles. Initial deployment requires admin permissions; ongoing operation does not. |
| 02 — Management of administrative privileges | Granular, permission-based access control enforced server-side at the API layer on every request: atomic permission codes grouped into roles, with Administrator the only built-in role (a server-side guard prevents removing the last active Administrator). Operational roles are tenant-configurable and separate from Administrator, and role assignments can be time-limited. The App Service authenticates via a system-assigned managed identity with no stored credentials, and Azure SQL is created Entra-first with Entra-only authentication (no SQL credential ever exists). See Authorization and RBAC. |
| 03 — Cloud console access | AccessPoint does not access the Azure Portal or any cloud management console at runtime. Azure resource management remains the department's responsibility. |
| 04 — Enterprise monitoring accounts | All telemetry is stored in the customer's Application Insights and Log Analytics workspace. Departments can grant CCCS/SSC read-only access per their standard procedures. See Logging, Monitoring, and Audit. |
| 05 — Data location | All stored data resides in the customer's Azure tenant in their selected Canadian region (Canada Central or Canada East) — including the optional AI Search, Azure OpenAI, Document Intelligence, Azure AI Speech, Defender for Storage, and Container Apps media-processing resources, which deploy into the department's own subscription. AI inference is the processing exception: from a Canadian region Azure OpenAI offers only the global deployment type, which may process inference outside Canada (see Canadian Data Residency). Recordings, transcripts, and released copies stay in the department's own storage account. License validation transmits only the tenant ID (via an Entra managed-identity token), API version, and the API's own base URL — no customer case data is transmitted to or stored by the publisher. The one optional egress, the Teams activity-feed notification payload, carries no requestor PII and can be minimised to routing identifiers or eliminated by self-hosting the relay; email and the in-app feed carry the same notices in-tenant. See Data Residency and Sovereignty and Teams Notification Data Sharing. |
| 06 — Protection of data at rest | Azure SQL TDE and Azure Blob Storage SSE (AES-256) enabled by default. Customer-managed keys (CMK) are supported for the documents storage account and the database, and an upgrade keeps them. Data-protection keys are wrapped by a Key Vault key. See Encryption. |
| 07 — Protection of data in transit | TLS 1.3 enforced at the App Service front door (TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 rejected); TLS 1.2+ on Azure SQL and Blob Storage. No plaintext endpoints. See Encryption. |
| 08 — Segment and separate | Each deployment has dedicated resources — no shared compute, storage, or database across customers. Blob paths and database queries are tenant-scoped, and the public portal runs as a separate web app whose identity reaches only its own schema and containers. Where a shared-services team serves several departments from one deployment, each department's data stays apart under the same tenant scoping, with a SQL Server row-level security policy in the shared database since 2.6.0, and each department has its own license. Network segmentation (private endpoints, VNet integration) is available in the template. See Data Residency and Sovereignty. |
| 09 — Network security services | The default deployment uses Azure PaaS public endpoints with platform-managed boundary protection. The template offers built-in hardening options: a virtual network (deployNetworkIsolation=true) with service endpoints or private endpoints and public access turned off for SQL, storage, Key Vault and the AI services; firewall rules and an Azure Front Door web application firewall in front of the portal and the API; and Defender for App Service. Departments can also add Application Gateway and NSG rules. |
| 10 — Cyber defense services | Microsoft Defender for SQL is enabled by default on the SQL logical server. Microsoft Defender for Storage on-upload malware scanning can be enabled on the documents account (deployDefenderForStorage=true), with verdicts enforced by one release gate before any file is previewed, played, downloaded, or released (including portal deliveries). Microsoft Defender for App Service can be enabled for the API and portal. Application Insights and Log Analytics data is accessible for integration with GC cyber-defense sensors and departmental SIEM. See Logging, Monitoring, and Audit. |
| 11 — Logging and monitoring | Immutable field-level audit trail in Azure SQL plus a hash-chained, append-only audit ledger with per-request case audit exports; an opt-in WORM blob container makes them write-once at the storage layer. Application Insights captures all API telemetry, with default metric alert rules (HTTP 5xx, latency) and an alert on audit-ledger anchor mismatches. Resource logs for the web apps, Front Door and blob storage, and the Key Vault audit log, go to Log Analytics with configurable retention (30–730 days). See Logging, Monitoring, and Audit. |
| 12 — Configuration of cloud marketplaces | The SPFx web part and Teams app are distributed via Microsoft AppSource. The Azure backend deploys via a Bicep/ARM template — through a guided form in the Azure portal or scripted with a PowerShell script — and every release is published with checksums, signatures and software bills of materials; the script verifies them and its strict mode refuses unsigned material. The SharePoint package can be installed from the browser through a page that verifies the signature before anything is installed. The worker images are pulled from the publisher's registry by default and can be mirrored into the department's own Azure Container Registry and pinned by digest so the workers pull with their managed identities from a department-controlled source. Departments approve installations through their standard App Catalog and Azure governance processes. See Deployment Model. |
| 13 — Plan for continuity | Azure SQL automated backups with point-in-time restore (extendable to 35 days), 30-day blob soft delete and versioning (configured by the template), and a stateless App Service enable rapid redeployment (the API bundles its schema and applies it on startup). The template deploys locally redundant blob storage, so the department plans an independent copy in a Canadian region and confirms that its database backups stay in Canada. A lapsed license makes AccessPoint read-only rather than unavailable. See Disaster Recovery. |
Configuring a Deployment for PBMM
The deployment's defaults give a working first installation. A PBMM deployment turns on the protections that its risk profile calls for. These are the choices departments most often make, all available on the guided Deploy to Azure form or through the deployment script:
| Choice | What it gives you |
|---|---|
| Canadian region | Create the resource group in Canada Central or Canada East; every resource takes the group's region. |
| Private network with private endpoints | SQL, storage, Key Vault and each deployed AI service sit behind private endpoints with public network access turned off. |
| Front Door with a web application firewall | In front of the public portal and, optionally, the API: managed TLS, rate limits on anonymous routes, a dot-segment block and, on Premium, Microsoft's managed rule sets and bot protection. Each fronted web app accepts traffic only from the Front Door profile. |
| Malware scanning | Microsoft Defender for Storage scans every upload; a flagged file is blocked from preview, playback, download and release through one release gate that also covers portal deliveries and the reading room. |
| Defender for SQL and Defender for App Service | Security alerts and weekly vulnerability assessment scans; threat detection for the API and portal. |
| Write-once evidence storage | A time-based immutability policy for exported evidence packages and audit-ledger anchors, with the retention period from your records schedule. |
| Alerts and logs | An alert address, resource logs for the web apps, Front Door and blob storage sent to your Log Analytics workspace, and log retention (30–730 days) set from your audit requirement. |
| Customer-managed keys | Your own key for the documents storage account and the database, with auto-rotation, where policy requires it. |
| Pinned, mirrored worker images | Worker images pinned by digest and mirrored into your own container registry. |
| Verified installation | A pinned version and the deployment script's strict mode, which refuses unsigned or unexpected material. |
| Keyless identities | No static secrets: managed identity (same tenant) or a federated app registration (split tenant) for Microsoft 365. |
| Conditional Access and MFA | Required for SharePoint, Teams and AccessPoint in your Entra tenant; AccessPoint never bypasses Conditional Access. |
| AI Assist | Leave it off unless the department accepts that, from a Canadian region, AI inference may be processed outside Canada. If you deploy it: choose the recommended or your own pinned models, set the monthly token budget, switch on only the features you need, and keep the content filters (always deployed). |
| Database backups and an independent copy | Extend point-in-time restore to 35 days, add long-term retention from your records schedule and confirm the backup storage redundancy keeps copies in Canada. The template deploys locally redundant blob storage; keep an independent copy in a second account or a backup vault in a Canadian region. |
| Least-privilege SQL runtime and row-level security | Connect the API as a restricted contained user rather than the database owner. A deployment that serves several departments runs the row-level security policy (audit mode first, then on) together with it. |
| Lab mode and AccessPoint Learning | Decide whether to keep Lab mode on, who may enter it and who manages training; grant Author learning content and Manage training to few people; decide with staff representatives what a training lead sees of check results; keep uploads into Lab mode off unless real practice files are needed. |
| A lapsed or revoked license | Nothing to configure. Renew before the grace period ends; past it the deployment is read-only until renewal, and notices, the portal's intake, connectors and AI pause. Plan how statutory deadlines and requestor contact are kept during such a period. |
Group-based roles fail closed: if a user's group membership cannot be checked, group membership grants nothing. The profile lists every choice with the controls it supports.
SA&A Process Guidance
When conducting a Security Assessment and Authorization for AccessPoint, departments should consider the following.
System Categorization
AccessPoint is typically categorized as PBMM when used for ATIP request processing. The system handles:
| Data Category | Classification | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Requestor PII (name, email, address) | Protected B | Personal information — serious injury if disclosed |
| Request records and descriptions | Protected B | May describe sensitive subject matter |
| Uploaded responsive documents | Up to Protected B | Classification depends on document content |
| Exemption decisions and rationale | Protected B | Disclosure could reveal deliberative processes |
| Audit trail and audit ledger | Protected B | Contain references to PII and request details |
| Application configuration | Internal | No sensitive data in configuration |
| Telemetry and logs | Internal | Performance data, no PII in telemetry |
Authorization Boundary
The AccessPoint authorization boundary comprises:
- The Azure App Service and its deployed application code
- The Azure SQL Database and all application data
- The Azure Blob Storage account and all stored documents
- The Key Vault that wraps the data-protection keys, and the document worker (a Container App) with its transient conversion container and queue
- The Application Insights and Log Analytics workspace
- The optional Azure AI Search, Azure OpenAI, Azure AI Document Intelligence, and Azure AI Speech resources, the Defender for Storage plan on the documents account, the media and accessibility Storage Queues and Container Apps jobs, the public portal web app and its Azure Front Door profile, and the Hybrid Connections relay, when deployed (all in the department's own subscription with managed-identity-only authentication)
- The Entra ID app registration and the App Service managed identity
- The SPFx web part deployed to SharePoint Online and the Teams app package
- All data flows between these components
The following are outside the AccessPoint authorization boundary and fall under the department's broader Azure/M365 SA&A:
- The Azure subscription and resource-group configuration
- Entra ID tenant policies (MFA, Conditional Access, device compliance)
- Network configuration (VNet, NSG, Private Endpoints)
- Azure platform services managed by Microsoft
Leveraging Existing Assessments
- Azure platform controls (PE, portions of SC and CP) are covered by Microsoft's CCCS assessment for PBMM. Departments can reference the CCCS cloud service provider assessment for Azure rather than re-assessing platform-level controls.
- Entra ID and M365 controls are covered by the department's existing M365 SA&A. AccessPoint inherits MFA, Conditional Access, and identity governance from the department's tenant configuration.
- AccessPoint application-level controls (AC, AU, the application layer of IA/CM/SI, and IR) must be assessed by the department. The Technical Architecture page provides the detailed control documentation.
Key Documents to Request
When evaluating AccessPoint, your SA&A team may want to request:
| Document | Purpose |
|---|---|
| This page + Technical Architecture | Security control documentation |
| Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Test (VAPT) results | Application security testing |
| Deployment Guide | Deployment procedure and post-deployment hardening |
| ITSG-33 security control profile (PBMM) | The publisher's control-by-control self-assessment for 2.6.0, its evidence, the PBMM configuration checklist and the known gaps (available from the publisher on request) |
Release integrity files (SHA256SUMS, signatures, SBOMs) |
Verification of what was downloaded and component inventory for vulnerability tooling |
| Dependency inventory | Supply-chain risk assessment (see Component Inventory; full dependency inventory available on request) |
| Incident response procedures and vulnerability disclosure policy | Vendor IR commitments (available from the publisher on request); security advisories are also delivered through the product |
| Privacy Impact Assessment | Personal information flows and privacy controls (see GC Privacy Impact Assessment) |
| Data flow diagrams | Data movement (see Architecture Diagram and Data Residency and Sovereignty) |
Hosted AccessPoint
Hosted AccessPoint (2.6.0) is the same software, run by Realizer for many organizations in Realizer's own Azure subscription in Canada Central, at app.realizer.io. The mapping above does not describe it as a service:
- Not assessed as a service. ITSG-33 and PBMM are documented for AccessPoint for Microsoft 365 as a department deploys it. The hosted service has not been certified, assessed or authorized by any third party. The publisher's profile describes the hosted edition's own controls and trust boundaries and marks where a control differs, but that is a description of the code, not an assessment of the service.
- Responsibility moves to Realizer. What this page puts on the department for its own deployment — the deployment choices, network, logging and alerting, backup and recovery, applying releases, key management and incident response for the environment — is Realizer's in the hosted service. The organization keeps what it controls inside the application: who it invites and their roles, which Microsoft organizations' accounts may join, session limits shorter than the service's maximum, its e-mail settings, retention periods and holds, its own data and exports, and its own incident response and statutory notifications. Its members' MFA is enforced by their own Microsoft organization (or by the person, for a personal account).
- What the hosted service does. Data stored in Canada Central with backups in Canada East; Microsoft sign-in with tokens kept on the server; organizations kept apart by the tenant filter and SQL Server row-level security; Azure Front Door with a web application firewall; Defender for Storage malware scanning; AI Assist off until each organization's Administrator allows processing that may take place outside Canada. The Technical Architecture page describes it in full.
- For an assessment of the hosted service, ask Realizer for its terms, privacy notice and security documentation, and assess it as a cloud service provider. The Hosted AccessPoint terms set out Realizer's commitments, and Customer Responsibilities lists what remains the organization's.
Related Pages
- Technical Architecture — components, identity, data residency and encryption.
- GC Privacy Impact Assessment — personal information flows and privacy controls.
- Deployment Guide — deploying with the PBMM-relevant options.
- Customer Responsibilities — what Realizer provides and what your department is responsible for, in each edition.