Pre-completed PIA template aligned with the TBS Directive on Privacy Impact Assessment for Canadian federal government departments deploying AccessPoint
Last updated: April 01, 2026 by Steve
GC Privacy Impact Assessment
This page provides a pre-completed Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) template aligned with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) Directive on Privacy Impact Assessment. It documents the personal information flows, privacy risks, and technical safeguards built into AccessPoint.
This template is intended to assist Canadian federal government departments in completing their own PIA for AccessPoint. It covers the technical and architectural sections — the deploying institution must complete the institutional details, retention schedules, and sign-off sections.
For the full technical architecture, see the Technical Architecture page. For ITSG-33 security control mapping, see the GC Security Controls Reference page.
How to Use This Document
This PIA is prepared by the software publisher (Realizer Services Inc.) to assist deploying institutions. The deploying institution must:
- Complete the Institutional Overview with their own organizational details
- Review and validate all sections against their specific deployment configuration
- Add institution-specific policies (retention schedules, breach response procedures, ISAs)
- Obtain approval from their ATIP Coordinator and Senior Official for Privacy
- Submit the completed PIA to TBS and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC)
Program Description
Purpose
AccessPoint is a subject access request (SAR) management solution that helps government institutions process access to information and privacy requests in compliance with the Access to Information Act (ATIA) and the Privacy Act. It manages the full lifecycle of requests from intake through assignment, document collection, review, redaction, and response packaging.
Business Process
- Intake — A Subject Access Officer (SAO) creates a request record based on a formal ATIA or Privacy Act request
- Assignment — The SAO assigns custodian assignments to records holders. Custodians receive sanitized instructions without requestor PII.
- Document Collection — Custodians and contributors upload responsive documents from desktops, SharePoint, OneDrive, or Outlook
- Review and Redaction — The SAO reviews documents, classifies relevance, applies exemptions, and redacts content
- Response Packaging — The SAO assembles the response package (merged PDF or ZIP) with a table of contents and manifest
- Closure — The request is closed, the response is sent, and the retention clock begins
Individuals Affected
| Class of Individuals | Relationship to Program |
|---|---|
| Requestors | Members of the public who submit ATIA or Privacy Act requests. Their personal information (name, address, contact details) is collected for request management and correspondence. |
| Institution Employees (SAOs, Administrators) | Staff who process requests. Their names and actions are recorded in the audit trail. They have access to requestor PII as required by their role. |
| Custodians and Contributors | Staff who collect and submit documents. They work from sanitized instructions and do not have access to requestor PII. |
| Third Parties | Individuals whose personal information may appear in documents under review. This PI is managed under the exemption review process (e.g., s.19 of the ATIA). |
Legal Authority
| Authority | Section | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Access to Information Act | s.4 | Right of access to government records |
| Access to Information Act | s.6 | Request submission requirements (name, address) |
| Access to Information Act | s.9 | Obligation to respond within statutory timelines |
| Access to Information Act | s.19 | Exemption for personal information |
| Privacy Act | s.4 | Authority to collect PI related to an operating program |
| Privacy Act | s.5 | Requirement to inform individuals of purpose of collection |
| Privacy Act | s.7 | Use limited to purpose of collection or consistent use |
| Privacy Act | s.8(2)(m) | Consistent use — processing requestor PI to administer ATIA requests |
Personal Information Inventory
Personal Information Collected and Processed
| Data Element | Sensitivity | Source | Purpose | Stored In |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Requestor full name | Medium | Requestor (via intake) | Identify requestor, correspondence | Azure SQL |
| Requestor email address | Medium | Requestor | Email correspondence | Azure SQL |
| Requestor mailing address | Medium | Requestor | Mail response delivery | Azure SQL |
| Requestor phone number | Low-Medium | Requestor | Telephone correspondence | Azure SQL |
| Requestor organization | Low | Requestor | Statistical reporting | Azure SQL |
| Request description | Medium | Requestor | Define scope of search | Azure SQL |
| Employee names (all roles) | Low | Entra ID | User identification, audit | Azure SQL |
| Employee email addresses | Low | Entra ID | Notifications, people picker | Azure SQL |
| Audit trail (user actions) | Low-Medium | System-generated | Accountability, compliance | Azure SQL |
| Documents under review | Potentially High | Institution records | ATIA response preparation | Azure Blob Storage |
| Redacted document versions | Medium | System-generated | Response packaging | Azure Blob Storage |
| Attestation records | Medium | Custodians | Formal sign-off on completeness | Azure SQL |
Personal Information NOT Collected
AccessPoint does not collect or process: Social Insurance Numbers, financial information, health records (as structured data), biometric data, criminal record information, device identifiers, IP addresses, browsing behavior, location data, or cookies/tracking identifiers.
Sensitive Personal Information in Documents
Documents collected during the ATIA process may contain any category of personal information, including sensitive PI about third parties. AccessPoint does not analyze or index document content — it stores, previews, and facilitates redaction. The classification and exemption of PI within documents is performed by trained SAOs.
Personal Information Flow Analysis
Collection
| Principle | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Authority | PI collected under the ATIA (s.6) and the Privacy Act (s.4) |
| Necessity | Only PI necessary to process the request is collected: requestor identity, contact information, and request details |
| Direct collection | PI is collected directly from the requestor and entered into AccessPoint by SAO staff |
| Limiting collection | The system does not collect PI beyond what is required. Fields are configurable by the institution. |
Use
| Principle | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Purpose limitation | Requestor PI used solely for processing the ATIA/Privacy Act request |
| Role-based access | Only Administrator, SAO, and Reviewer roles can view requestor PII. Custodians and Contributors never see requestor PI — enforced at the API level. |
| No automated decision-making | No AI, profiling, or algorithmic processing of PI. All decisions are made by trained staff. |
| Statistical reporting | Reports produce aggregate statistics only — they do not expose individual requestor PI. |
Disclosure
| Disclosure | Details |
|---|---|
| To the requestor | Response package provided under ATIA s.7 |
| Internal — SAO/Reviewer | Requestor PI disclosed to authorized staff for processing. Role-controlled. |
| Internal — Custodians/Contributors | No disclosure. Sanitized instructions only. PII stripped by server-side middleware. |
| Email notifications | Custodian/Contributor templates do not contain requestor PI. SAO templates may include request number but not requestor identity. |
| Teams notifications | Contain only notification type, request number, and assignment/task name. No requestor PI. |
| Publisher (Realizer Services) | Receives only tenant ID (license validation) and notification metadata (recipient user ID, notification type, request number). No requestor PI transmitted. |
| Microsoft | Sub-processor under the institution's Microsoft Cloud Agreement. Data processed within the institution's Azure tenant. |
Retention and Disposal
| Principle | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Retention management | Built-in Retention Review feature with configurable periods per request type |
| Purge mechanism | Permanently deletes request records, documents, assignments, tasks, attestations, and audit history. Logged in the RetentionPurgeLog table. |
| Backup retention | Azure SQL automated backups retain data for 7-35 days depending on tier. Configurable LTR. |
Privacy Risk Assessment
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation | Residual Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unauthorized access to requestor PII | Low | Medium | Six-tier RBAC with server-side enforcement. Custodians/Contributors architecturally excluded from PII. Entra ID MFA. | Low |
| PI breach via document exposure | Low-Medium | Medium-High | Encryption at rest (TDE, AES-256). Role-based authorization. Redaction tools for PI removal before response. | Low-Medium |
| PI in notifications | Very Low | Low | Custodian/Contributor templates auto-strip PII. Teams notifications contain only notification type and request number. | Very Low |
| PI transmission to publisher | Very Low | Low | Publisher receives only tenant ID and notification metadata. No PI, documents, or request details transmitted. | Very Low |
| PI outside Canadian jurisdiction | Config-dependent | Medium | Data stored in institution's Azure subscription in the region they select (Canada Central/East recommended). | Institution to assess |
| Inadequate retention/disposal | Low-Medium | Medium | Built-in Retention Review with configurable periods and purge logging. | Low (with proper config) |
| Insider threat | Low | Medium | Comprehensive audit trail with user attribution. Role-based access limits exposure. | Low |
Risk Area Scores
Per the TBS standardized framework:
| Risk Area | Score | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Type of program or activity | 2 | Administration of program/activity (ATIA administration) |
| Type of personal information | 3 | Contact information and potentially sensitive records in documents |
| Program partners | 2 | Microsoft (sub-processor), Realizer (no PI access) |
| Duration of the program | 4 | Long-term/ongoing statutory obligation |
| Program population | 3 | External individuals exercising statutory rights |
| PI transmission | 2 | Encrypted cloud infrastructure within Canadian jurisdiction |
| Technology and privacy | 2 | Standard web application — no AI, surveillance, or biometrics |
| Potential impact on individual | 2-3 | Possible embarrassment or reputational harm if requestor identity disclosed |
Overall risk level: Moderate — standard for an administrative program processing PI of external individuals. Mitigated by strong technical controls.
Technical and Administrative Safeguards
Authentication and Access Control
| Safeguard | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Authentication | Microsoft Entra ID with JWT bearer tokens. No local user accounts. |
| Multi-factor authentication | Enforced by the institution's Entra ID Conditional Access policies |
| Role-based access control | Six roles enforced server-side on all API endpoints |
| PII filtering | Server-side middleware strips requestor PI for Custodian, Contributor, and Reader roles |
| Session management | Token-based, lifetime governed by Entra ID policies |
Encryption
| Layer | Implementation |
|---|---|
| In transit | TLS 1.3 minimum on all connections |
| At rest — database | Azure SQL TDE with Microsoft-managed keys |
| At rest — documents | Azure Blob Storage AES-256 encryption. CMK available. |
| At rest — secrets | Azure Key Vault with managed identity access |
Monitoring and Audit
| Safeguard | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Application audit trail | All actions recorded with user ID, timestamp, field, old/new values |
| Retention purge log | All purge operations logged with user attribution |
| Application monitoring | Azure Application Insights — HTTP requests, exceptions, dependencies |
| Log Analytics | Centralized log storage with KQL query for security investigations |
For the complete technical architecture including network security, dependency inventory, and disaster recovery, see the Technical Architecture page.
Third-Party Services and Data Sharing
| Service | Role | PI Received | Data Location |
|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft Azure | Sub-processor (IaaS) | All application data | Institution's Azure region |
| Microsoft 365 | Processor (communications) | Email/Teams notification content | Institution's M365 tenant |
| Realizer Services | Publisher (no PI role) | Tenant ID + notification metadata only | Publisher's Azure (Canada) |
| Syncfusion | Embedded library (not a service) | None — processing occurs within App Service | Institution's App Service |
Key point: No requestor PI, document content, or request details are transmitted to Realizer Services or any external party. All document processing (conversion, redaction) occurs within the institution's own App Service.
Applicable Personal Information Banks
| PIB | Registration Number | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Access to Information Act and Privacy Act Requests | PSU 901 | Records related to ATIP requests |
| Employee Personnel Records | PSE 901 | Employee names and roles in audit trail |
Institutions should confirm applicable PIBs and whether new PIBs are required for their specific deployment.
Data Flow Diagrams
High-Level Architecture
Requestor Institution Staff Azure Subscription
(SharePoint / Teams) (Institution-controlled)
│
│ Entra ID JWT
▼
┌────────────────────┐
│ SPFx Web Part / │
│ Teams Personal App │
└────────┬───────────┘
│ HTTPS (TLS 1.3)
▼
┌────────────────────┐
│ ASP.NET Core API │
│ (App Service) │
│ - PII Filter MW │
│ - Role Auth MW │
│ - Audit Logging │
└──┬──────┬──────┬───┘
│ │ │
┌────────┘ │ └────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
┌──────────────┐ ┌───────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ Azure SQL │ │ Blob │ │ Key Vault │
│ Database │ │ Storage │ │ (Secrets) │
│ (TDE) │ │ (AES-256) │ │ │
└──────────────┘ └───────────┘ └──────────────┘
Notification Data Flow
Event (e.g., assignment created)
│
▼
API Notification Service
│
├── PII Filter: strips requestor PI for Custodian/Contributor templates
│
├──► Email: Graph Mail.Send → Institution's shared mailbox → Recipient
│ (via managed identity or institution's app registration)
│
└──► Teams: API → Realizer Platform → Graph TeamsActivity.Send → Recipient
(sends: user ID, notification type, request number — NO requestor PI)
Document Processing Flow
User uploads document
│
▼
API stores in Azure Blob Storage (encrypted at rest)
│
▼
On preview/export: Syncfusion converts to PDF (within App Service)
│
▼
SAO applies redactions (within App Service)
│
▼
Response package generated → stored in Blob Storage → downloaded by SAO
All document processing occurs within the institution's App Service. No document content is transmitted to external services.