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Pre-completed PIA template aligned with the TBS Directive on Privacy Impact Assessment for Canadian federal institutions using AccessPoint, in their own Microsoft 365 and Azure or as Hosted AccessPoint

Last updated: November 10, 2026 by Steve

GC Privacy Impact Assessment

This page is a public summary of the Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) prepared by the software publisher (Realizer Services Inc.) for AccessPoint, aligned with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) Directive on Privacy Impact Assessment. It documents the personal information holdings, information flows, privacy risks, and safeguards built into the product, as of AccessPoint 2.6.0.

Two editions. Most of this page describes AccessPoint for Microsoft 365, which the institution deploys into its own Azure subscription and uses from SharePoint and Teams; Realizer never holds its data. From 2.6.0 there is also Hosted AccessPoint at app.realizer.io: Realizer runs the same software for the institution in Realizer's own Azure subscription in Canada, and is then the institution's service provider (a processor) for everything the institution keeps in it. An institution on the hosted edition reads every section with Hosted AccessPoint, which says what changes.

The publisher's PIA covers the technical and architectural sections and is intended to help Canadian federal institutions complete their own PIA. The deploying institution completes the institutional details (institutional overview, retention schedules, information sharing agreements, and sign-off) and submits the completed PIA to TBS and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC). The full PIA is available to customers on request — see the closing note.

For the full technical architecture, see the Technical Architecture page. For ITSG-33 security control mapping, see the GC Security Controls Reference page.

Purpose and Scope

AccessPoint is an access-to-information and privacy management platform that helps government institutions administer access and privacy programs under the Access to Information Act (ATIA), the Privacy Act, and equivalent provincial/international regimes. Its primary function is subject access / access-to-information request management — the full lifecycle from intake through assignment, document collection, review, redaction, and response packaging.

Beyond request handling, AccessPoint also supports the surrounding privacy program: Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA/AIA/Security assessments), privacy incident and breach management (including breach-notification workflows), complaints and appeals, a privacy risk register and commitments register, and records of processing (ROPA). These modules process additional categories of personal information and are covered by the same safeguards, roles, audit ledger, and data-residency controls as the request-management core.

Several optional components change what personal information is collected or where it flows, and the institution should assess each it deploys: the public intake portal (requestors submit requests, complaints and incident reports online, track them, and receive responses without an account), online fee payment through the institution's payment provider, repository connectors that collect records from systems outside Microsoft 365, video and audio records, AI Assist, and Lab mode (called train mode before 2.6.0: a training copy of the tenant that holds fictional cases only). Case archiving moves closed cases' files to cooler storage tiers and supports disposition and preservation holds. AccessPoint Learning (2.6.0) keeps training records about staff: learning paths, check results, certificates and completion records.

Business process: intake (an SAO creates the request) → assignment (custodians receive sanitized instructions without requestor PII) → document collection → review and redaction → response packaging, in one or more numbered releases since 2.6.0 → closure (the retention clock begins).

Individuals affected: requestors; institution employees (SAOs, Administrators) whose actions are recorded in the audit trail; custodians and contributors (who do not have access to requestor PII); third parties whose PI may appear in documents under review; data subjects described at the category level in ROPA and assessments; individuals affected by a privacy incident; complainants and complaint parties; consultation contacts; staff in training, whose training progress and AccessPoint Learning records are kept; and, in the hosted edition, the members of the institution's hosted organization, who sign in with a Microsoft work, school or personal account after an Administrator invites them.

Legal authority: collection and use rest primarily on the ATIA (ss.4, 6, 9, 19) and the Privacy Act (ss.4, 5, 7, 8(2)(m), and the individual's right of access).

Personal Information Inventory

Personal Information Collected and Processed

Data Element Sensitivity Source Purpose Stored In
Requestor full name Medium Requestor (via intake) Identify requestor, correspondence Azure SQL
Requestor email address Medium Requestor Email correspondence Azure SQL
Requestor mailing address Medium Requestor Mail response delivery Azure SQL
Requestor phone number Low-Medium Requestor Telephone correspondence Azure SQL
Requestor organization Low Requestor Statistical reporting Azure SQL
Request description Medium Requestor Define scope of search Azure SQL
Subject name Medium-High Requestor (via intake) Identify the subject of the request (may differ from requestor) Azure SQL
Subject date of birth High Requestor (via intake) Identity verification for privacy requests Azure SQL
Employee names, emails, Entra object IDs Low Entra ID User identification, notifications, authentication, audit Azure SQL
Audit trail (user actions) Low-Medium System-generated Accountability, compliance Azure SQL
Documents under review Potentially High Institution records ATIA response preparation Azure Blob Storage
Video and audio records under review (body-worn, CCTV, dispatch, interview, voicemail, Teams meeting recordings) Potentially High Institution records ATIA response preparation; the original is never modified — playback proxy, poster, thumbnails, waveform, and the burned release copy are derived files stored beside it Azure Blob Storage
Transcripts and captions of recordings (opt-in) Potentially High System-generated (Azure AI Speech in the institution's subscription, or the Teams-generated transcript captured with a meeting recording) Find-in-transcript, captions, content search, duplicate detection, AI grounding, transcript-anchored redaction proposals; served only to users holding the requestor-PII permission Azure SQL (segments) and Azure Blob Storage (word offsets, captions)
Face-detection and region-tracking proposals (opt-in) Medium System-generated inside the institution's App Service Bounding boxes over time proposed as redaction marks; no facial template or identity is derived or stored, and nothing is sent to a cloud vision service Azure SQL
Redacted document versions Medium System-generated Response packaging Azure Blob Storage
Attestation records and e-signatures (typed name) Low-Medium Custodians Formal sign-off on completeness Azure SQL
IP addresses and user agent strings (attestation, document access) Low-Medium System-captured Forensic audit of signing/access context Azure SQL
Requestor communications Medium SAO staff Correspondence records (direction, method, date, notes) Azure SQL
Delegation records Low-Medium SAO/Administrator Officer responsibility delegation Azure SQL
Consultation records and contact directory Low-Medium SAO staff Inter-departmental or external consultation Azure SQL
Requestor contact directory Medium Requestor / intake staff Reusable requestor identity; the request links to a contact rather than storing PII inline Azure SQL
Requestor conduct log Medium ATIP staff / system-generated Append-only, dated, attributed conduct observations and review outcomes — the evidentiary record behind a frivolous/vexatious determination. Entries are never edited; deletion is Administrator-only and audited Azure SQL
Requestor conduct analysis memo Medium ATIP staff (optionally AI-drafted, human-reviewed) Written analysis supporting or declining an F&V determination; can be rendered as a formal-record PDF Azure SQL / Azure Blob Storage
Vendor register contacts Low-Medium Privacy staff Business contact details of third-party processors/vendors, alongside DPA/contract facts and review cadence Azure SQL
Incident affected-PI details Potentially High Privacy/ATIP staff Incident facts, affected-PI categories, harm assessment, breach-notification tracking Azure SQL
Complaint parties and correspondence Medium Privacy/ATIP staff Complainant/party identity and complaint handling Azure SQL
Records-of-processing (ROPA) categories Low-Medium Privacy staff GDPR Article 30 descriptions by category of data subject/recipient — not individual records Azure SQL
Assessment questionnaire answers Low-Medium Privacy staff / delegates PIA/AIA/Security content; may describe PI handled by a program Azure SQL
Microsoft 365 captured records (opt-in) Potentially High The custodian's own M365 data Custodian-captured email, calendar, OneNote, Teams chats, Teams meeting recordings with their transcripts, or Copilot interactions as a responsive record Azure Blob Storage (converted PDFs and recordings)
Extracted document text Potentially High (mirrors document content) System-generated (incl. optional OCR of image-only scans and of sampled video frames) Plain text extracted for content search, duplicate detection, redaction suggestions, and AI grounding Azure SQL; optionally indexed in the institution's own Azure AI Search resource
AI document summaries (opt-in) Medium (may describe PI in the document) System-generated (Azure OpenAI in the institution's subscription) Cached machine-generated summary per document and language, regenerated on content change Azure SQL
AI usage metadata (opt-in) Low System-generated Metadata-only log of AI Assist calls: feature, model, token counts, calling user, and human accept/dismiss decisions. Prompt and response bodies are never stored Azure SQL
Hash-chained audit ledger Low-Medium System-generated Tamper-evident, append-only ledger of actions across all modules, including public portal events (an e-mail hash, a keyed pseudonym of the IP address and its network, not the address itself) Azure SQL
Public portal submissions (opt-in) Medium Requestor Form answers, the requestor's e-mail address (encrypted with a public key whose private half only the API holds, plus a hash for look-ups), attachments, and client details (IP address, user agent, anti-automation outcome); unverified submissions are purged after about 8 days, rejected ones after 30 days by default, and registered ones are cleared from the portal after 30 days by default Azure SQL (the portal schema) and the portal-staging container
Public portal sessions, verification codes and messages (opt-in) Low-Medium Requestor / system A one-time e-mailed code opens a session (codes and tokens stored hashed; 30-minute sliding, 8-hour maximum); requestor replies, added detail, withdrawals and attachments; short retention Azure SQL (the portal schema)
Secure deliveries (opt-in) Medium System Copies of released response packages for download, with download counts and acknowledgement; deleted at expiry (30 days by default) or revocation Azure Blob Storage (portal-deliveries)
Fee payments (opt-in) Medium Staff / payment provider Amount, currency, method, reference, reason and date; for an online payment, the provider's verified notification, which can include payer details the provider supplies. No card or bank details are ever received Azure SQL
Record provenance from connectors (opt-in) Low System Source system, path, version and hash of records collected through repository connectors Azure SQL
Case archiving records Low System / Administrators Storage tier of each moved file, preservation holds (reason and matter reference, visible only to holders of the hold permission), package sent marks, and a disposition log of disposed items (case number, document name, content hash, size); the disposition log is never purged and document names are cleared when the case is purged Azure SQL
Releases (2.6.0) Low-Medium Staff Each numbered release of a response: which records went out, at which redaction state and page numbers, its letter and delivery, a fee instalment, the dates a release schedule told the requestor, and the reason for a corrected or supplemental release; deleted with the request Azure SQL
Training progress and exercise participation Low Staff / training leads Which training items each person completed and when (no scores, timings or clicks), assigned learning paths, and who took part in a team exercise; pruned after 90 days by default Azure SQL
AccessPoint Learning records (2.6.0) Low-Medium (check scores) Staff / training leads Per person: enrolments in learning paths, how each step was known to be done (verified, confirmed by a named mentor, or the person's own statement — never time spent, clicks or what was viewed), check results (latest score, passed, attempts), decisions and reflection notes private to the person, completion records and certificates, and training done elsewhere recorded by a lead. What a lead sees of check results is the institution's choice. Step states follow the 90-day progress period; completion records and certificates are kept 7 years by default (1–15), also after the person leaves Azure SQL
Lab mode training copy None by design System / staff The institution's configuration copied into a separate training tenant, and fictional cases that staff work on. Real cases, requestors, documents, secrets and the audit ledger are never copied; nothing in Lab mode is sent, delivered, paid, uploaded or captured The same database and storage under a separate training tenant identifier
Lab mode simulated people (2.6.0) None — no personal data The training scenario (fictional) Scripted colleagues in the training copy: a fictional character's name, job title and an undeliverable placeholder address. No real person, sign-in, directory account or role; never shown, notified or counted outside Lab mode The training copy only, removed when it is reset or refreshed

Held Only in the Hosted Edition

Everything in the table above is held the same way in Hosted AccessPoint, in Realizer's subscription. The hosted edition adds:

Data Element Sensitivity Source Purpose Stored In / Retention
Organization registry Low The member who created the organization The organization's name and status, the creating account's identifier, and the Microsoft tenants whose accounts may join (Who can join, at most 10) The service's registry, while the organization exists
Memberships Low Microsoft sign-in One row per account and organization: the account's identifier, status, created and last sign-in dates, with the member's name, e-mail address and language Removed with the organization; a removed member's rows stay, inactive, like a departed user's
Invitations Low Administrators The invited e-mail address, the roles offered, who invited and when, and a hash of the link (never the link); a link works 14 days Azure SQL
Sign-in sessions Low The web host The member's Microsoft tokens, kept on the server and never in the browser; a session record under a random identifier; functional __Host- cookies only (the session, the organization chosen, why a session ended) A separate token-cache database; a session lasts at most the organization's limit, 12 hours at most
Client address Low The web host The browser's IP address, for rate limits and request logs Realizer's Log Analytics workspace, 30 days
E-mail settings and budgets Low Administrators / system Whether e-mail notices are on, the confirmed Reply-To address, and per-organization counts of recipients reached this hour and day Azure SQL
Lifecycle notices Low System Which of Realizer's fixed notices (trial reminders, the move to the Free plan, purge warnings) went to the organization's Administrators, when, and to how many With the organization
Organization exports Medium — the file holds everything Administrators Who started Download all of your organization's data, when, and its single download. The file holds every row and file of the organization, requestor details included, but not the Lab mode copy Deleted after 14 days; every start and download in the audit ledger
Activity summary and session counts (sent to Realizer) None — counts and dates only System At most once a day, the dates of the organization's first request, first assessment and first Lab case finished, member counts and the last sign-in day; every five minutes, two counts of active sessions for the whole region. Never a name, address or case content Realizer's control plane
Sign-up attribution (sent to Realizer) Low The sign-up link Where the first owner came from: a fixed list of campaign keys, each checked and length-capped; never a URL Realizer's control plane, on the organization's record

Personal Information NOT Collected

AccessPoint does not collect or process: Social Insurance Numbers; payment card or bank account data (online payments are redirect-only: the requestor pays on the payment provider's page and AccessPoint never receives a card number); health or medical records as structured data (they may appear in documents under review); biometric data; criminal record information; location data; or tracking or analytics identifiers. The staff application sets no tracking cookies. The optional public portal sets two functional cookies only (the session, after the requestor confirms a code, and the chosen language), and loads no analytics or third-party script. The hosted edition's pages load no analytics or third-party script either; their cookies are the functional ones listed above. The optional face detection used for video redaction locates faces in frames so a reviewer can blur them; it does not identify anyone, produces no facial template, and runs inside the institution's own App Service or media job.

Note: IP addresses and user agent strings are captured only in limited contexts for forensic audit and abuse prevention: attestation signing, document access logging and, on the optional public portal, submissions, codes, sessions, messages and payment sessions. Each has a defined retention. With resource logs turned on (the default), the web apps' request logs and the storage account's access log also record client IP addresses, retained in the institution's Log Analytics workspace for the configured period. General browsing behavior and device fingerprinting are not collected.

Sensitive Personal Information in Documents

Documents collected during the ATIA process may contain any category of personal information, including sensitive PI about third parties. AccessPoint stores, previews, and facilitates redaction of documents, and — to support the review tools — extracts each document's plain text into the database (with optional OCR of image-only scans via an in-subscription Azure AI Document Intelligence resource). That extracted text powers content search (optionally indexed into the institution's own Azure AI Search resource), duplicate detection, pattern/rule-based redaction suggestions, and (when the optional AI Assist component is deployed) machine-generated suggestions and summaries. All of this processing occurs within the institution's own Azure subscription, and every machine-produced redaction or suggestion is a proposal: classification and exemption of PI within documents is decided by trained SAOs using the built-in review tools.

Repository connectors (opt-in): records held in other systems (file shares, Hyland OnBase, OpenText Content Server, Laserfiche, Axon Evidence, Azure Blob Storage, SQL views, CMIS repositories and MCP-compatible search services) can be browsed, searched and collected into a case. Each call carries the acting user's identity, the case and the purpose, so the source system can apply and log its own permissions. Connector traffic runs between the institution's API and hosts the institution operates, in its subscription or on its premises; the publisher never sees it.

Recordings (video and audio): a recording is stored unmodified and reviewed in a media viewer. With the optional Azure AI Speech resource, its audio is transcribed in the institution's subscription; with Document Intelligence, sampled frames can be read for on-screen text; and face detection and region tracking run inside the App Service with no external call. Every machine-produced mark is a proposal a reviewer accepts or dismisses, and the release copy is rendered with the accepted marks burned in and listed in a hash manifest.

Microsoft 365 record capture (opt-in, feature-toggle-gated): a custodian can capture their own Microsoft 365 records — Outlook email, Outlook calendar, OneNote, Teams chats, Teams meeting recordings (meetings the user organized, with the Teams transcript), Microsoft Lists, or Copilot interaction history — as a responsive record. Capture always uses the signed-in user's own delegated identity and is scoped to that user's own data (Copilot retrieval is app-only, as no delegated Graph permission exists, but is always scoped server-side to the signed-in user's own Entra object ID — never tenant-wide). Captured content is rendered to a PDF and enters the normal review/redaction workflow. Calendar capture excludes items marked Private/Personal/Confidential by default.

Personal Information Flow Analysis

Stage Summary
Collection PI is collected under ATIA s.6 (request submission requires name and address) and Privacy Act s.4 (collection related to an operating program). Only PI necessary to process the request is collected, directly from the requestor and entered by SAO staff. Fields are configurable by the institution.
Use Requestor PI is used solely to process the ATIA/Privacy Act request. Only roles granted the view-requestor-PII permission (typically the Administrator, SAO, and Reviewer archetypes) can view requestor PII — Custodians and Contributors never see it (enforced server-side by PII-filter middleware). AccessPoint makes no automated decisions about individuals: the optional AI Assist component produces only suggestions, editable drafts, and read-only answers, and every exemption, redaction, disclosure, and determination decision is made by trained staff. Fixed statistical reports are aggregate only; the custom Report Builder exposes record-level fields only to roles holding the reporting permission, visibly flags PII fields in its catalog, and never offers PII fields to the AI "Ask AccessPoint" feature.
Disclosure The response package is provided to the requestor (ATIA s.7). Internal disclosure to SAO/Reviewer staff is role-controlled; Custodians/Contributors receive sanitized instructions only. Email and Teams notifications to custodians/contributors carry no requestor PI. The publisher receives only the tenant ID, API version, and the API's own base URL (license validation and web-part discovery), notification metadata (recipient user ID, activity type, actor display name, request number, preview/topic text, related record reference), and jurisdiction-pack installation reports — no requestor PI. With the optional public portal, a response package is delivered to the requestor through a time-limited secure download that only a session verified by the same e-mail address can open, and a released package can optionally be published in a reading room (two different staff members must approve). With online fee payment, the payment provider receives the amount, currency, a short reference, the request number and return addresses; Stripe also receives the requestor's e-mail address, and no provider receives the requestor's name from AccessPoint. Microsoft processes data as a sub-processor within the institution's own tenant. Hosted edition: Realizer stores and processes all of the institution's AccessPoint data for it; its control plane receives the organization's name, the first owner's name and e-mail address, the plan and billing state, the sign-up attribution and the activity summary of counts and dates — never case content, requestor information or documents. Every e-mail, letters to requestors included, goes through Azure Communication Services in Realizer's subscription (data stored in Canada) from accesspoint@notices.realizer.io, with replies to the address the institution confirmed. For paid plans, Stripe receives the organization's name, its hosted identifier and a billing e-mail address; card details are entered on Stripe's own page.
Retention and disposal A built-in Retention Review feature applies configurable retention periods per record type across five registers (requests, assessments, incidents, complaints, and standalone risks) through one RetentionService. Purge permanently deletes the record with its documents, assignments, tasks, attestations, and related history — re-evaluating eligibility at purge time and blocking records with cross-case dependencies — and is logged in the RetentionPurgeLog table (which is itself never purged). Case archiving (off until an Administrator switches a storage policy on) moves a closed case's files to cooler storage tiers in the same account and region, and original records to the Archive tier only after the statutory waiting periods the institution has configured; preservation holds stop every purge, delete and disposal on a case until released; and disposition (keeping only what was released, or only the case record) is manual, restricted to Administrators and logged in a disposition log that is never purged. Public portal records expire on short schedules, and Lab mode data is removed at each refresh; AccessPoint Learning's completion records and certificates are kept 7 years by default (1–15). Blob versioning and 30-day soft delete are on by default. Azure SQL point-in-time restore keeps 7 days by default (configurable up to 35 days, plus long-term retention). A lapsed license (2.6.0, both editions) makes AccessPoint read-only instead of stopping it: nothing is deleted, and reading, search, reports, exports and Lab mode keep working until it is renewed. Hosted edition: an organization on the Free plan that nobody uses may be removed 90 days after it moved to the Free plan if it never really started, otherwise after 12 months — only after every active Administrator is warned 30 and 7 days before (at least 90 days before while a received request is open), never while any member signs in or a new case is created, never under a preservation hold, and only by an operator command. An organization that leaves downloads its data first; Realizer deletes it once a complete export is recorded, and deletes or anonymizes its own records of the organization 90 days later. Deleted rows age out of the database's point-in-time restore backups. [Institution to confirm the exit terms in its agreement with Realizer.]
Accuracy Requestor PI is entered from the original request form onto the reusable requestor contact record (every request links to a contact); employee PI is sourced from Entra ID and refreshed on each sign-in. The system does not enrich records from external sources or profile individuals. It does produce derived representations of content already held: extracted document text (including optional OCR), machine translations of staff-entered narrative fields (never overwriting a human translation), and — when the optional AI Assist component is deployed — cached document summaries and suggestion/draft outputs that staff accept or dismiss.

The notification path illustrates the "no requestor PI to the publisher" control:

Event (e.g., assignment created)
        │
        ▼
  API Notification Dispatch Service
        │
        ├── PII Filter: strips requestor PI for Custodian/Contributor templates
        │
        ├──► Email: Graph Mail.Send → Institution's shared mailbox → Recipient
        │    (via managed identity or institution's app registration)
        │
        └──► Teams: API → Realizer Platform API → Graph TeamsActivity.Send → Recipient
             (sends: user ID, activity type, actor name, request number, preview text — NO requestor PI)

Privacy Risk Assessment

Risk Likelihood Impact Mitigation Residual Risk
Unauthorized access to requestor PII Low Medium Granular permission-based RBAC with server-side enforcement; Custodians/Contributors architecturally excluded from PII; Entra ID MFA; permission checks on every request. Low
PI breach via document exposure Low-Medium Medium-High Encryption at rest (TDE, AES-256); role-based authorization; no public document access; redaction tools remove PI before response packaging. Low-Medium
PI in notifications Very Low Low Custodian/Contributor templates auto-strip PII; SAO notifications include the request number but not requestor identity; Teams notifications carry only notification type, request number, and task/assignment name. Very Low
PI transmission to publisher Very Low Low The publisher receives only the tenant ID and API address (license validation) and notification metadata — no PI, documents, or request details — and has no standing access to the institution's Azure resources. Very Low
PI outside Canadian jurisdiction Config-dependent Medium Data is stored in the institution's Azure subscription in the region it selects (Canada Central/East recommended); the Microsoft Cloud Agreement addresses data residency. In the hosted edition everything is stored in Canada Central with backups in Canada East; Microsoft sign-in and Azure Front Door are global services, Stripe processes billing in its own jurisdictions, and AI Assist, once an Administrator allows it, may be processed in other Microsoft regions. Institution to assess
Inadequate retention/disposal Low-Medium Medium Built-in Retention Review with configurable periods and purge logging; institution aligns schedules with Library and Archives Canada disposition authorities. Low (with proper configuration)
Insider threat (authorized-user misuse) Low Medium Comprehensive audit trail with user attribution and timestamps; role-based access limits exposure; Administrators control role assignments; reading-room publication needs a second approver; departed users are detected and their work can be reassigned. Low
Public portal (internet-facing collection) Medium (internet exposure) Medium A one-time e-mailed code on every session (single use, locked after 5 attempts); a session opens only the records of the address it verified; a separate web app whose identity reaches only its own schema and containers; per-address rate limits and a proof-of-work challenge; a strict content security policy with no third-party scripts; requestor e-mail addresses encrypted at rest; optional Front Door with a web application firewall; short retention. Low-Medium (depends on the security of the requestor's e-mail account)
Online payments Low Medium Redirect-only providers, so no card data is handled; a payment is recorded only from a signature-verified provider notification or an explicit status query; provider credentials are encrypted under a key wrapped by the institution's Key Vault. Low
Repository connectors Low Medium The API calls only registered connector hosts with its own managed identity and per-call attribution; the source system applies and logs its own permissions; connector traffic never reaches the publisher. Low
Video and audio records Medium (recordings routinely capture bystanders) Medium-High Face and on-screen-text detection only propose marks for staff to accept (no recognition or identification); blur, mute, bleep and voice distortion are burned into a new released copy and the original is never altered; transcripts mask speaker names for users without the requestor-PII permission. Low-Medium
AI processing Low (optional) Medium Runs only on the institution's own Azure OpenAI resource with managed-identity access and content filters; Microsoft does not train on the data; outputs are suggestions that staff accept or dismiss; per-feature switches and a monthly budget; usage metadata and a per-record disclosure of AI involvement. Low (reassess if the global deployment type is used)
Lab mode (real and training data mixed) Low Medium The training copy is a separate tenant identifier kept apart by the same unconditional tenant filter as any other tenant; it receives configuration only, never cases, requestors, documents or secrets; outbound actions (letters, portal, payments, connectors, uploads, Microsoft 365 capture, Teams) are refused or simulated; AccessPoint Learning's own records are refused in Lab mode; every screen says it is training; an automated isolation test gates the release. Low (staff must be told not to type real personal information into a training case)
Hosted edition: Realizer holds the institution's data Low Medium-High Stored in Realizer's Azure subscription in Canada Central, with backups and stored files geo-replicated to Canada East, under the same permission model, PII filtering and hash-chained audit ledger as the Microsoft 365 edition; Entra-only database authentication with a least-privilege runtime identity; no shared-key storage access; Key Vault for keys; Defender for SQL in production. Whole-organization operations (export, move, purge) only by an operator command, never a web endpoint, each logged with the operator's name. Realizer's control plane receives counts and dates, never case content. Low-Medium [institution to confirm Realizer's service agreement, data processing terms and breach notification commitments]
Hosted edition: organizations sharing one database Low High Every row carries its organization; the tenant query filter is unconditional, and SQL Server row-level security is a second, independent barrier in the database itself. Every call names an organization and is refused without an active membership of it, with the same answer for an unknown organization and another organization's. Files sit under each organization's own storage prefix, and the data download is keyed on the caller's own organization. Isolation is covered by automated tests with the policy on and off. Low
Hosted edition: sign-in and membership Low-Medium (internet service; personal Microsoft accounts are accepted) Medium-High Microsoft sign-in only, with tokens kept on the server; invitations matched only against addresses the sign-in proves, stored as hashes, valid 14 days; Who can join can admit only work accounts of the institution's own Microsoft tenants; sign-out after inactivity and a longest session set by the institution, enforced on the server; per-organization e-mail budgets; a Reply-To used only once confirmed. Low-Medium (depends on the security of members' Microsoft accounts and on the institution's Who can join choice)
Hosted edition: loss of records when a subscription lapses or an organization is inactive Low High A lapse never deletes anything: the organization becomes read-only and every record stays readable and exportable. Only an inactive Free organization can be removed, after the warnings described above, and a preservation hold refuses it. Download all of your organization's data gives the institution its own copy at any time. Low (keep at least one active Administrator who reads AccessPoint's e-mail)
What Realizer keeps about the institution as a customer Low Low The hosted activity summary is counts and dates only, by design. Realizer's records of a deleted hosted organization are deleted or anonymized 90 days after the deletion. Realizer's CRM receives a hosted customer's organization and deal with no contact person; the billing import keeps identifiers, statuses, dates and amounts, never a name, address, e-mail or tax number. Realizer's admin console admits only Realizer's own tenant with MFA and records every action in an append-only audit. Very Low

Risk Area Scores

Per the TBS standardized framework:

Risk Area Score Rationale
Type of program or activity 2 Administration of program/activity (ATIA administration)
Type of personal information 3 Contact information and potentially sensitive records in documents
Program partners 2 Microsoft (sub-processor); Realizer (no PI access)
Duration of the program 4 Long-term/ongoing statutory obligation
Program population 3 External individuals exercising statutory rights
Personal information transmission 2 Encrypted cloud infrastructure within Canadian jurisdiction
Technology and privacy 2 Standard web application — no surveillance, biometrics, or automated profiling. Optional AI Assist features (Azure OpenAI in the institution's own subscription) are suggestion/draft-only — a person makes every decision, and only usage metadata is logged. Optional face detection for video redaction locates faces to blur them, derives no identity or template, and runs in-tenant. Institutions deploying the optional AI, speech, or detection components should reassess this score.
Potential impact on the individual 2-3 Possible embarrassment or reputational harm if requestor identity disclosed

Overall risk level: Moderate — standard for an administrative program processing PI of external individuals, mitigated by strong technical controls (encryption, RBAC, PII filtering, data sovereignty).

Hosted edition: reassess Program partners (Realizer becomes the service provider holding the data, with Microsoft and Stripe as its subprocessors) and Personal information transmission (everything stored in Realizer's subscription in Canada Central; Microsoft sign-in and the edge service are global).

Technical and Administrative Safeguards

Authentication and Access Control

Safeguard Implementation
Authentication Microsoft Entra ID with JWT bearer tokens. No local user accounts or passwords. In the hosted edition: Microsoft sign-in through Realizer's hosted app registration, plus an active membership of the organization.
Multi-factor authentication Enforced by the institution's Entra ID Conditional Access policies. In the hosted edition MFA follows each member's Microsoft account — its organization's policies for a work account, the person's own settings for a personal account; Who can join can admit work accounts of the institution's own tenants only.
Continuous Access Evaluation Supported — token validation occurs on every API request.
Role-based access control Granular, tenant-configurable permission roles enforced server-side on all API endpoints. Administrator is the only built-in role; tenants define roles matching the archetypes (SAO, Reviewer, Custodian, Contributor, Reader), typically seeded from a jurisdiction pack.
PII filtering Server-side middleware strips requestor PI from responses for any caller not holding the view-requestor-PII permission; it cannot be bypassed by the client.
Session management Token-based; lifetime governed by Entra ID policies.
First-user bootstrap The first user is granted the Administrator role. No default or shared credentials exist, and a server-side guard prevents removing the last active Administrator.

Encryption

Layer Implementation
In transit TLS 1.3 minimum at the App Service front door; TLS 1.2+ on Azure SQL and Blob Storage; FTPS disabled.
At rest — database Azure SQL Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) with Microsoft-managed keys, or a customer-managed key in Key Vault.
At rest — documents Azure Blob Storage AES-256 encryption; customer-managed keys (CMK) available, and an upgrade keeps them.
At rest — secrets Stored connector and payment-provider secrets are encrypted under a key ring wrapped by an RSA-3072 key in the deployment's Key Vault (on by default), accessed via managed identity; every use of the key is logged. Requestor e-mail addresses on the public portal are encrypted with a public key whose private half only the API holds.

Network Security

Safeguard Implementation
HTTPS only All HTTP traffic rejected; HTTP/2 enabled.
CORS Restricted to the institution's SharePoint domain.
Rate limiting 1,200 requests/minute per authenticated user (operator-adjustable).
Security headers X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, Content-Security-Policy.
Management plane SCM/FTP basic authentication disabled; management via Azure Portal with Entra ID + MFA only.

Monitoring and Audit

Safeguard Implementation
Application audit trail All create/update/delete actions recorded with user ID, timestamp, field changed, and old/new values.
Tamper-evident audit ledger A hash-chained (SHA-256), append-only ledger records actions across all modules; integrity is verifiable server-side, and a court-ready case audit export (formerly "evidence package") can be produced for a request.
Document access log Preview and download events recorded with user ID, timestamp, IP address, and user agent. Insert-only.
Retention purge log All purge operations recorded with user attribution.
Application monitoring Azure Application Insights captures HTTP requests, exceptions, and dependency calls (90-day retention by default, configurable to 730 days); resource logs for the web apps, Front Door and blob storage go to the same workspace.
Alert rules Configurable metric alerts for HTTP 5xx errors and high latency, and alerts on SQL authentication failures and audit-ledger anchor mismatches.
Log Analytics Centralized log storage with KQL query capability for security investigations.

Administrative Safeguards

Administrators assign roles via Settings; role and Entra group changes take effect within 5 minutes. An Exchange Online application access policy restricts Mail.Send to the mailboxes AccessPoint sends as: the shared sender mailbox, the intake mailboxes that send letters, and the officers who send correspondence from their own mailboxes. Configuration changes are applied via versioned jurisdiction packs with install audit logging. Staff training, acceptable-use policy, and breach-response procedures are specified by the institution; Lab mode, learning paths, team exercises and AccessPoint Learning (modules, checks, certificates and completion records) can support the training.

Hosted Edition Safeguards

Safeguard Implementation
Sign-in The web host signs members in with Microsoft (work, school or personal accounts) and keeps their tokens on the server; the browser holds only __Host- cookies (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax), and every call carries a custom header with no cross-origin access allowed.
Membership Every call names an organization and is refused without an active membership; only an Administrator's invitation creates one.
Who can join An optional list of up to 10 Microsoft tenants whose work or school accounts may use the organization; a personal account never passes a list; each change is in the audit ledger.
Session limits The organization chooses sign-out after inactivity (from 15 minutes) and the longest session (from 1 hour), up to the service's maximum of 120 minutes and 12 hours, with a warning before each; enforced on the server for each call, so a copied cookie cannot be replayed after a session ends.
Isolation The unconditional tenant filter, SQL Server row-level security, a least-privilege runtime identity and per-organization storage prefixes.
Operator settings The service-wide settings (the sender, the link every e-mail carries) belong to Realizer and are refused to subscribers.
E-mail One budget per organization, counted per recipient before a message leaves (lower on the trial and the Free plan); a Reply-To is used only after a six-digit code sent to it is confirmed.
Data download Download all of your organization's data: that organization's Administrators only, never in Lab mode, one job at a time and three a month, a single-use five-minute link streamed through the API, deleted after 14 days; every start and download in the audit ledger.
Edge and monitoring Azure Front Door with a web application firewall in front of the web host and the API, which admit only Front Door; Application Insights and request logs in Realizer's Log Analytics workspace (30 days); Defender for SQL in production.
Malware scanning Microsoft Defender for Storage scans every uploaded file (objects over 50 GB are not scanned); infected files cannot be previewed, downloaded or released, and files still being scanned are held.
Document, media and accessibility processing Run in Azure Container Apps in Realizer's subscription (Canada Central), one worker of each kind shared by every organization. A job carries only its own organization's file, the API applies each result only to that organization's record, and the workers never reach the database. Each worker's storage access covers every organization's files, so a worker compromised through one organization's hostile file is contained by its own hardening and the malware scan, not by organization.
AI Assist Off for each organization until one of its Administrators allows processing that may take place outside Canada (see Hosted AccessPoint).

Third-Party Services and Data Sharing

Service Role PI Received Data Location
Microsoft Azure Sub-processor (IaaS: App Service, SQL, Blob, Key Vault, Application Insights) All application data Institution's Azure region
Microsoft 365 Processor (Graph Mail.Send, Teams activity feed) and, optionally, a source of custodian-captured records Email/Teams notification content; for opt-in capture, that custodian's own M365 content Institution's M365 tenant
Realizer Services (Publisher) Software publisher — no processor role for customer PI in the Microsoft 365 edition None — tenant ID + API base URL + notification metadata + jurisdiction-pack install reports only Publisher's Azure (Canada)
Realizer Services (hosted edition) Service provider (processor) for all of the institution's AccessPoint data Everything the institution keeps in AccessPoint (see Hosted AccessPoint) Realizer's Azure subscription, Canada Central; backups in Canada East
Stripe (hosted edition, paid plans) Billing, under the institution's agreement with Realizer The organization's name, its hosted identifier and a billing e-mail address; requests over a plan's allowance as counts. Card details, the billing address and any tax number are entered on Stripe's own page and never reach AccessPoint or Realizer Stripe's own jurisdictions — the institution should confirm
Document worker (default on) Institution-deployed Container App running the publisher's code-only worker image, using AccessPoint's own document engine Office, HTML and e-mail files are converted to PDF in the institution's own subscription with no external transfer; the worker reaches only a transient conversion container and queue, never the case documents, database or API, and the job files are deleted as soon as the API has the result Institution's Azure subscription
Azure AI Search (opt-in) Institution-deployed resource — content search index Document metadata, extracted text, and content embeddings Institution's Azure subscription
Azure OpenAI (opt-in — AI Assist) Institution-deployed resource — suggestions, drafts, summaries, translation Bounded excerpts of case records and extracted document text at call time Institution's Azure subscription
Azure AI Document Intelligence (opt-in — OCR) Institution-deployed resource — text from scanned documents and sampled video frames Document pages and video frames sent for prebuilt-read analysis Institution's Azure subscription
Azure AI Speech (opt-in — transcription) Institution-deployed resource — transcripts and captions of recordings A 16 kHz mono extract of each recording's audio, read from the institution's storage account by the Speech account's own managed identity Institution's Azure subscription
Microsoft Defender for Storage (opt-in — malware scanning) Institution-deployed service on the documents storage account Every uploaded blob is scanned on write; AccessPoint reads only the verdict Institution's Azure subscription
Azure Container Apps media job (opt-in — media processing) Institution-deployed job running the publisher's code-only worker image Recordings read from and written back to the institution's own storage account; the job never connects to the database or API Institution's Azure subscription (the default image is pulled anonymously from the publisher's registry — image tag, IP, and time only — and can be mirrored into the institution's own registry)
Payment provider (opt-in — Stripe, Paymentus or the institution's processor) Third-party processor under the institution's contract with it The amount, currency, a short reference, the request number in the description and return addresses; Stripe also receives the requestor's e-mail address; card and bank details are entered on the provider's own page and never reach AccessPoint The provider's own jurisdiction — the institution should confirm
Azure Front Door (opt-in — public portal) Institution-deployed global Azure service in front of the portal and, optionally, the API Requestor traffic to the portal passes through it (a global service) Global — the institution should confirm against its residency requirements
Repository connectors (opt-in) Connector hosts the institution operates, in its Azure subscription or on its premises (reached through a Hybrid Connection where there is no public endpoint) Browse, search and capture calls carrying the acting user's identity, the case and the purpose; captured records land in the institution's own storage Institution's subscription or premises

Optional Azure services. The optional resources above are not publisher services: each deploys into the institution's own subscription and region, authenticates with the App Service managed identity only (API-key access disabled), and sends nothing to Realizer Services. Every AI output is a suggestion, an editable draft, or a read-only answer — staff decide; per-feature tenant toggles and a monthly token budget (which hard-stops all AI processing) provide governance; Microsoft does not train models on the data; and AccessPoint stores only call metadata, never prompt or response bodies. Where Azure OpenAI inference is processed depends on the deployment type chosen at deploy time (global or EU/US data zone) — institutions should confirm the choice against their residency requirements. From 2.6.0 the institution also chooses the models: Realizer's recommended models (gpt-6-luna and gpt-6.1-sol in 2.6.0) or models it names; where its region does not offer the recommended models and it names no AI region, a new Azure OpenAI account is placed in a region of the same geography (for example UK West → UK South). Case audit exports for a request include an AI-involvement disclosure (metadata only), and the same information is visible on each record's Activity feed.

Key point (Microsoft 365 edition): No requestor PI, document content, recording, or request details are transmitted to Realizer Services. Document conversion, redaction, and face-detection processing occur within the institution's own App Service, document worker or media job, with no external transfer, and the optional search, OCR, transcription, and AI processing occurs within the institution's own Azure subscription. The exceptions the institution should assess are the ones it chooses: a payment provider (which receives the payment details described above), Azure Front Door in front of the portal, and the Azure OpenAI deployment type (the default global type may process inference in other Microsoft regions).

Hosted AccessPoint

Use this section with every other one when the institution uses AccessPoint at app.realizer.io instead of deploying it. The hosted edition's Canadian region answers at ca.app.realizer.io; app.realizer.io only forwards each visit there and stores nothing. The architecture is described in Hosted AccessPoint on the Technical Architecture page.

What Changes

AccessPoint for Microsoft 365 Hosted AccessPoint
Where the software and data run The institution's Azure subscription and Microsoft 365 tenant Realizer's Azure subscription, Canada Central, for the institution; backups and stored files geo-replicated to Canada East
Realizer's role Publisher; no access to the data The institution's service provider (processor) for all of its AccessPoint data, and the publisher
Sign-in The institution's Entra ID, with its MFA and Conditional Access A Microsoft work, school or personal account through Realizer's hosted app registration; the account's own organization, or Microsoft for a personal account, authenticates it
Who is a member Anyone the institution's tenant lets in and AccessPoint grants a role Only people an Administrator invited; optionally only work accounts of named Microsoft tenants (Who can join)
E-mail The institution's own mailboxes through Microsoft Graph Azure Communication Services in Realizer's subscription (data stored in Canada), from accesspoint@notices.realizer.io, with replies to the institution's confirmed address
Microsoft 365 capture, Teams, directory check, group roles Available Not available
Repository connectors Optional Not offered
Public portal Optional, in the institution's subscription Offered only where the hosted service runs it
AI Assist Optional, on an Azure OpenAI resource in the institution's subscription Optional, on Azure OpenAI models Realizer provisions in Canada as global deployments, so prompts and answers may be processed in other Microsoft regions; off for each organization until an Administrator allows it, and the permission can be withdrawn at any time. OCR, search and transcription are processed in Canada and need no permission
Database One of the institution's own One shared by many organizations, isolated row by row
A lapsed subscription Read-only Read-only; a trial or cancelled paid plan moves to the Free plan
Leaving The institution keeps its Azure resources Download all of your organization's data, then Realizer deletes the organization; Realizer's own records of it are deleted or anonymized 90 days later

Subprocessors. Microsoft — Azure hosting in Canada, Entra ID sign-in, Communication Services e-mail, Azure Front Door (a global edge service) and the AI services; Stripe — billing of paid plans. Realizer's own business systems receive no case data.

Realizer's access. Realizer administers the service's Azure resources. Operations on a whole organization run only through an operator command in the service's own environment, never through a web endpoint, and each is logged with the operator's name.

Reading the rest of this page. The inventory applies in full, in Realizer's subscription, with the hosted rows added; Microsoft 365 capture and repository connectors do not apply. The risk of PI being sent to the publisher is replaced by the hosted risks, and the residency question becomes Realizer's region, Canada Central. Network isolation, customer-managed keys, mailbox scoping and resource-log settings are Realizer's configuration, not the institution's; the institution's own choices are its members and roles, Who can join, session limits, e-mail settings, retention periods and holds.

What the institution should obtain from Realizer. [Institution to record: the service agreement and its data processing terms (see the Hosted AccessPoint terms); the subprocessor list; the breach notification commitments — Realizer's security notices go to the organization's Administrators and its account contact, the first owner's address unless changed; and the exit terms.] What the institution remains responsible for is listed in Customer Responsibilities.

Services Realizer Runs Beside AccessPoint

  • AccessPoint Training Lab (learn.realizer.io) — a separate service where training providers run classes on a simulation of AccessPoint. The institution's staff may attend a provider's class; nothing passes between the institution's AccessPoint and the Lab. The training provider decides what its classes collect, and Realizer is its processor.
  • Marketing demo (demo.realizer.io) — AccessPoint's screens on fictional data in the visitor's browser; nothing is entered, saved or uploaded.

Applicable Personal Information Banks

PIB Registration Number Description
Access to Information Act and Privacy Act Requests PSU 901 Records related to ATIP requests
Employee Personnel Records PSE 901 Employee names and roles in the audit trail

Institutions should confirm applicable PIBs and whether new PIBs are required for their specific deployment.

Availability of the Full PIA

The full Privacy Impact Assessment — including the complete personal information inventory, detailed collection/use/disclosure/retention/accuracy analysis, legal authorities, data flow diagrams and an appendix for the hosted edition — is available to customers and prospective customers on request. Deploying institutions use it as the technical and architectural basis for their own PIA, completing the institutional overview, retention schedules, information sharing agreements, and sign-off before submitting to TBS and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.